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Abstract
We settle the complexity of computing a discrete CEEI (Competitive Equilib-
rium with Equal Incomes) assignment by showing it is strongly NP-hard. We
then highlight a fairness notion (CEEI-FRAC) that is even stronger than CEEI
for discrete assignments, is always Pareto optimal, and can be verified in poly-
nomial time. We also show that computing a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment
is strongly NP-hard in general but polynomial-time computable if the utilities
are zero or one.
Keywords: Fair division, Computational Complexity, Competitive
Equilibrium with Equal Incomes
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1. Introduction
CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) is one of the most
fundamental solution concepts in resource allocation [5, 8]. The concept is based
on the idea of a market based equilibrium: each agent has cardinal utilities over
objects and each agent is considered to have equal budget of unit one to spend.
Based on the utilities of the agents, an assignment of objects is in CEEI, if for
some price vector, the supply meets demand and the agents use their budget
to maximize utility. CEEI is an attractive solution concept because it implies
envy-freeness.
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre [2, 3] highlighted a scale of fairness
criteria. Among the criteria, they positioned CEEI [5, 10] as the most stringent
which implies the other fairness criteria. Recently, Othman et al. [9] showed
that finding a discrete A-CEEI assignment is PPAD-complete and it is NP-hard
to distinguish between an instance where an exact CEEI assignment exists, and
one in which there is no A-CEEI tighter than guaranteed in Budish [5].
Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre [2, 3] posed the following open problem: what is
the computational complexity of checking whether these exists a discrete CEEI
assignment? We settle this problem by showing it is strongly NP-hard. In
addition to the CEEI notion previously studied [2, 3, 5, 10] which we will from
now on refer to as CEEI-DISC, we highlight a notion called CEEI-FRAC that is
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stronger than CEEI-DISC. The desirable aspect of CEEI-FRAC is that it implies
the CEEI-DISC and unlike CEEI-DISC, it implies Pareto optimality. Whereas
the complexity of checking whether an assignment is CEEI-DISC has been open,
we show that CEEI-FRAC can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that
computing a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment is strongly NP-hard in general
but polynomial-time if the utilities are zero or one. Independently from our
work [1], Branzei et al. [4] recently presented complementing complexity and
characterization results for CEEI-DISC and showed that checking whether a
given assignment is CEEI-DISC is coNP-complete. Hence, there is a marked
contrast between the complexity of testing CEEI-DISC and CEEI-FRAC.
2. Preliminaries
An assignment problem is a triple (N,O, u) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is
the set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , om} is the set of objects, and u = (u1, . . . , un)
is the utility profile which specifies for each agent i ∈ N utility function uij
where uij denotes the utility of agent i for object oj . We assume that for each
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uij > 0 for some i ∈ N and for each i ∈ N , uij > 0 for some
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
A fractional assignment x is a (n × m) matrix [xij ] such that xij ∈ [0, 1]
for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, and
∑
i∈N xij = 1 for all oj ∈ O. The value
xij represents the fraction of object oj being allocated to agent i. Each row
xi = (xi1, . . . , xim) represents the allocation of agent i. The set of columns
correspond to the objects o1, . . . , om. A feasible fractional assignment is discrete
if xij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and oj ∈ O. Let the set of all fractional allocations be
F and the set of all discrete allocations be D. Each agent has additive utility so
that the utility received by agent i from assignment x is ui(xi) =
∑
oj∈O
xijuij .
The Nash welfare of an assignment x is
∏
i∈N ui(xi).
An assignment x satisfies CEEI-DISC if there exists a price vector p =
(p1, . . . , pm) that specifies the price pj of each object oj such that the max-
imal share that each i ∈ N can get with budget 1 is xi ∈ {x
′ ∈ D : x′i ∈
argmax{ui(x
′
i) :
∑
oj∈O
x′ij · (pj) ≤ 1}}. Note that the assignment x itself could
be fractional. When we only consider discrete assignments, CEEI-DISC coin-
cides with the CEEI notion for discrete allocations studied in [2, 3, 5, 10]. An
assignment x satisfies CEEI-FRAC if there exists a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm)
that specifies the price pj of object oj such that the maximal share that
each i ∈ N can get with budget 1 is xi ∈ {x
′ ∈ F : x′i ∈ argmax{ui(x
′
i) :∑
oj∈O
x′ij · (pj) ≤ 1}}. CEEI-FRAC coincides with the market equilibrium
notion studied in [12].
3. CEEI-DISC
We settle the complexity of CEEI-DISC and answer the open problem in
[2, 3].
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Theorem 1. Computing a discrete CEEI-DISC assignment is weakly NP-hard
even for two agents.
Proof. We reduce from the following weakly NP-complete problem [7]:
Partition
Input: A multiset S of m positive integers with total sum 2W .
Question: Does there exists a partition of the elements in S such
that the sum of integers in each set in the partition is W?
We construct an assignment instance with two agents and m objects corre-
sponding to the m integers. Agents have identical utilities for the m objects
and the utility of each object is equal to the integer weight of the corresponding
integer. Note that there exists a discrete assignment in which each agent gets
the same utility (W ) iff there is an partition of the integers corresponding to
the utility weights so that each set of integers has total weight W . Also ob-
serve that when agents have identical utility functions, a (complete) discrete
assignment x satisfies CEEI-DISC if and only if the utilities of all the agents are
identical (Proposition 12, [2]). Hence we get that Partition has a yes instance
iff there exists a CEEI-DISC discrete assignment. Since Partition is weakly
NP-complete, it follows that computing a discrete CEEI-DISC assignment is
weakly NP-hard.
Next we show that computing a discrete CEEI-DISC assignment is strongly
NP-hard.
Theorem 2. Computing a discrete CEEI-DISC assignment is strongly NP-
hard.
Proof. We reduce from the following strongly NP-complete problem [7]:
3-Partition
Input: A finite set E = {e1, . . . , e3n} of 3n elements, a bound
W and integer weight w(ej) for each ej ∈ E such that
W
4
< w(ej) <
W
2
and w(E) =
∑3n
j=1 w(ej) = nW .
Question: Can E can be partitioned into n disjoint sets E1, . . . , Em
and weight w(Ei) = W for all i ∈ [n]?
We construct an assignment instance with n agents and 3n objects corre-
sponding to the 3n integers. Agents have identical utilities for the 3n objects
and the utility of each object is equal to the integer weight of the corresponding
integer. Note that there exists a discrete assignment in which each agent gets the
same utility (W ) iff there is an integer tri-partition of the integers correspond-
ing to the utility weights so that each set of integers has total weight W . Also
observe that when agents have identical utility functions, a (complete) discrete
assignment x satisfies CEEI-DISC if and only if the utilities of all the agents
are identical (Proposition 12, [2]). Hence we get that 3-Partition has a yes
instance iff there exists a CEEI-DISC discrete assignment. Since 3-Partition
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is strongly NP-complete, it follows that computing a discrete CEEI-DISC as-
signment is strongly NP-hard.
4. CEEI-FRAC
Vazirani [12] points out that a market equilibrium allocation always exists for
fractional assignments and it can be computed via the solution to the following
linear program with a convex objective due to Eisenberg and Gale where each
agent has budget ei.
max
n∑
i=1
ei log ui s.t. ui =
m∑
j=1
uijxij ∀i ∈ N
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
Using duality theory, one can interpret the dual variable pi associated with
the constraints
∑n
i=1 xij ≤ 1 as the price of consuming a unit of object oj [11,
12]. Since in CEEI-FRAC, each agent has equal budget, we have the following
facts [12]:
Fact 1. A fractional assignment maximizing Nash welfare gives a CEEI-FRAC
solution.
Fact 2. All CEEI-FRAC assignments give the same utility to the agents and
prices to the objects.
From Facts 1 and 2, we get that an assignment is a CEEI-FRAC assign-
ment if and only if maximizes Nash welfare among all fractional assignments.
Note that even for discrete settings, CEEI-FRAC constitutes a well-defined and
attractive fairness concept. A CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment is an assign-
ment that yields the same utilities as the unique utilities and prices from the
fractional CEEI assignments.
Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre [2] wondered whether Pareto optimality and envy-
freeness is also a sufficient condition for CEEI-DISC. The next argument shows
that this is not the case for discrete CEEI-FRAC assignments.
Theorem 3. An envy-free and Pareto optimal assignment may not be CEEI-
FRAC.
Proof. An assignment that is EF and PO may not be CEEI-FRAC. Consider
the following utilities of agents: Then both complete discrete assignments in
o1 o2 o3 o4
1 95 5 2 1
2 1 2 5 95
which agent 1 gets o1 and agent 2 gets o4 are envy-free and Pareto optimal.
However the assignment in which 1 gets only o1 and 2 gets the other objects is
not a CEEI-FRAC assignment.
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Next, we show that verifying a discrete CEEI-FRAC assignment is easy
whereas checking whether there exists a discrete assignment which is CEEI-
FRAC is strongly NP-complete.
Theorem 4. It can be checked in polynomial-time whether a given discrete
assignment y is a CEEI-FRAC assignment.
Proof. Compute in polynomial time the utilities achieved by the agents in a
CEEI-FRAC fractional solution x via the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. The
discrete assignment y is a CEEI-FRAC assignment iff the utilities achieved by
the agents in y are the same as in x.
Theorem 5. Checking whether there exists a discrete assignment which is
CEEI-FRAC is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. Checking whether exists a discrete assignment is CEEI-FRAC is equiv-
alent to checking whether there exists one which achieves the maximum Nash
welfare that can be achieved by a fractional assignment. The problem is strongly
NP-hard via the same reduction as in proof of Theorem 2.
The argument above also shows that for a restricted domain, if Nash welfare
maximization is in P for discrete assignments, then checking whether there exists
a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment is also in P.
Lemma 1. If a Nash welfare maximizing discrete assignment can be computed
in polynomial time, it can be checked in polynomial time whether a CEEI-FRAC
discrete assignment exists or not.
Proof. In order to check whether a discrete CEEI-FRAC assignment exists or
not, we can compute a Nash welfare maximizing discrete assignment and check
whether the Nash welfare achieved is equal to the objective acheived in the
Gale-Eisenberg program.
Corollary 1. If agents have utilities zero or one, then it can be checked in
polynomial time whether a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment exists or not.
Proof. The statement follows from the fact that for 1-0 utilities, a Nash welfare
maximizing discrete assignment can be computed in polynomial time [6].
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